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ABSTRACT 
 
Institutional theory is employed for examining how and to what extent external 
pressure leads to changes in the venture idea during the start-up and early life of new, 
knowledge-intensive ventures. From a population of 321 young, knowledge-intensive 
firms that underwent a training program at Linköping University, structured telephone 
interview data were obtained from 167 firms. The results confirmed that the venture 
idea had undergone more change in ventures that had more external owners, a 
dominant customer, and an incubator location. The results imply that institutional 
theory is a meaningful tool for understanding why and how venture ideas change over 
time.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A key research goal in entrepreneurship is explaining the development of venture 
ideas or—as they are often called—’opportunities’ (Venkataraman, 1997). Unlike 
theoretical expositions like Krizner’s (1973)—which portrays entrepreneurial 
discovery as an instantaneous flash of insight by particularly ‘alert’ people—scholars 
who conduct empirical work have come to recognize that entrepreneurial discovery is 
not simply an event where the complete venture idea is found. Rather, it is a process 
that includes the identification, evaluation, elaboration and modification of ideas 
leading to firm emergence (Bhave, 1994; de Koning, 2003; Hills, 1995; Long & 
McMullan, 1984; Mckelvie & Wiklund, 2004; Sarasvathy, 2001). As a means of 
overcoming a perceived fragmentation of the knowledge in this area Ardichvili et al. 
2000 reviewed, analyzed and integrated existing literature and proposed a theoretical 
model that ‘conceives of opportunity identification/recognition as a multistage process 
in which entrepreneurs play active roles’ (p. 121). That is, as the process unfolds, 
venture ideas transform iteratively from vague notions of how to fulfill a market need 
to clearly defined business concepts (Klofsten, 2004).   
 
In discussions of the field entrepreneurship research influential voices on both sides of 
the Atlantic have recently suggested that the main focus should be on the interplay 
between the emerging new venture and the individual(s) who create it. Shane and 
Venkataraman (2000) denote this ‘the individual-opportunity nexus’ while Bruyat and 
Julien (2000) talk about the ‘dialogic between the individual and the project’. While 
neither completely disregards external factors both perspectives clearly give the 
environment a secondary role. That such relative disregard for the environment can 
come at a cost—at least in research on development of venture ideas—is 
demonstrated by several researchers. For instance, Mckelvie and Wiklund (2004) 
found that in dynamic markets, close market interaction (i.e. testing and probing of 
ideas) and the development of knowledge were critical in meeting market needs. A 
recent study by de Koning (2003) investigated how entrepreneurs are affected by their 
social networks and how they manage their social context to advance and pursue 
opportunities. In a rare empirical study of product development in entrepreneurial 
high-tech firms, Pavia (1991) found evidence that scanning competitors and their 
potential new products was a fruitful way to exploit current technologies more 
effectively, thereby improving their customer offering. On the basis of an empirical 
study of expert entrepreneurs’ decision-making Sarasvathy (2001) theorizes that 
entrepreneurial processes are often signified by an incremental and iterative process, 
which she calls effectuation, where the venture ideas goes through evolutionary as 
well as revolutionary change as a result of interaction with the environment.   
 
An explicit or at least implicit assumption in most such accounts is that the changes 
made to the venture idea as a result of such interaction are competition and efficiency 
based. In other words, the entrepreneur is expected to act according to rational 
economic logic, or at least in line with his or her preference structure. This paper 
challenges this notion by employing Institutional Theory as the theoretical lens. 
According to this perspective various forms of external pressures may make new or 
emerging ventures adapt in systematic and (probabilistically, but not 
deterministically) predictable ways. More specifically, the institutional pressures will 
tend to make the emerging or new venture more similar to other business ventures. 
These adaptations may or may not lead towards maximal economic outcomes or the 
attainment of the true goals of the individuals concerned. That is, the perspective 
highlights that while adapting to pressures in the environment may sometimes be 
necessary to gain legitimacy and ensuing success, such pressure may occasionally lure 
business founders into following practices that do not lead to goal attainment, and 
which are therefore best resisted. Arguably, awareness of this potential is important 
for entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship researchers alike.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces some fundamental ideas 
and concepts from Institutional Theory. In the then following section specific 
hypotheses are derived from this theoretical perspective with regards to the degree 
and direction of change in the venture ideas that new or emerging firms are pursuing. 
The method section describes the survey method used for the empirical investigation, 
which is followed by a presentation of results concerning the tests of the hypotheses. 
In the concluding section these results are discussed alongside limitations and avenues 
for future research. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY  
 
Katz and Gartner (1988) and Aldrich (1999) regard venture start-ups primarily as 
emerging organizations (rather than primarily as new competitive activities that stir up 
equilibrium in the marketplace; cf. Shane & Venkataraman, 2000). This is a 
perspective that fits well with the purpose of this paper and with Institutional Theory. 
The idea that the environment can have a strong influence on the development of new 
organizations is hardly new. Neither is it a new thought that such external pressures 
can lead organizations towards isomorphism (i.e., the process of homogenization). For 
example, in the model of perfect competition in standard micro-economic theory there 
is no way a firm can survive if it does not completely adhere to economic rationality 
and the price and volume decisions it dictates within this model (Mansfield, 1979).      
  
Such isomorphism, which DiMaggio and Powell (1983) call competitive isomorphism 
is also dominant in Hannan & Freeman’s (1977) classic account of Population 
Ecology. In viewing organizations as open systems that are affected by their 
environment, it becomes apparent that forces impacting the organization are more 
complex than just competition and efficiency (Scott, 2000). For instance, cultural 
influences (Barley & Tolbert, 1997) have a direct impact on decision making and 
formal structures as do uncertainty, legitimacy, and politics (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). This institutional isomorphism is the type of homogenization highlighted in 
Institutional Theory and which will be focused on in this article.  
 
In Institutional Theory the organizational field is comprised of organizations that 
mirror recognized areas of institutional life, such as resource and product consumers, 
suppliers, regulatory agencies, (DiMaggio & Powell 1983) and, technical practices 
(Karnoe, 1995). According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), at some point 
‘structuration’ in the field may occur if: 
 
1. There is an increase in interaction among organizations in the field 
2. An emergence of inter-organizational structures of domination and patterns of 
coalition 
3. An increase in the information load with which organizations in the field must 
contend 
4. A development of mutual awareness among participants in a set of 
organizations that they are involved in a common enterprise  
 
Structuration of an industry constrains the ability of organizations to deviate from the 
norm, vaulting the pursuit of legitimacy, rather than just efficiency, as a reason for 
change. This constraining force is the isomorphism that DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
postulate. A key theme in institutional theory, then, is that organizational action is 
influenced by tangible and intangible sources of institutional pressures. This occurs 
through three analytically (albeit perhaps not empirically) separable forms: normative, 
coercive, and mimetic forces. All three lead organizations towards isomorphism as 
they struggle for ways to combat uncertainty and gain legitimacy (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983).  
 
Coercive forces stem formally or informally from pressure exerted on the organization 
from other organizations that provide resources and through legal or otherwise 
regulated expectations placed on the organization by society. Clear examples of 
coercive isomorphism are present in the start up phase of companies, e.g., when they 
file tax forms and follow standard incorporation procedures mandated by 
governments. One example of coercive isomorphism can be found in Brytting’s 
(1991) doctoral dissertation where an entrepreneur seeking funding and a banker 
eager to accommodate a reliable partner, colluded together on a ‘fake’ written plan in 
order to please the superiors in the bank and adhere to the internal, formal rules. 
Neither side really cared about the content of the plan; they trusted the proven 
‘business ability’ of the entrepreneur. In this example coercive acquiescence was 
motivated by political influence and legitimacy.  
 
Mimetic isomorphism occurs due to uncertainty in the environment that forces 
organizations to mimic what is perceived to be ‘best practice’. This can manifest itself 
through copying standard business models or scanning the environment to benchmark 
competitive practices and employed technologies (Pavia, 1991). One example of this 
is what could be witnessed occurring during the ‘dot-com’ boom. Young companies 
displayed their utter lack of respect towards the ‘establishment’ by setting up ping-
pong tables in their break rooms, allowing employees to show up at work dressed in 
Hawaiian shirts, khaki shorts, and Birkenstock sandals. Traditional organizational 
structures were scoffed at in favor of flatter, more egalitarian structures. Ironically, in 
rebelling against the ‘establishment’, new dot.com start-ups were actually mimicking 
each other in an uncertain environment and hence were actually conforming to, rather 
than resisting established institutional pressures. 
  
Normative pressures arise because of professionalization. A classic example of 
normative pressure can be found in Willmott (1986, p. 559, referring to Larkin, 1983), 
as he investigated the field of accounting to conclude that ‘… professional 
associations are seen primarily as political bodies established and maintained to 
define, defend and enhance the symbolic and material value of their members’ skills.’ 
Moving from the substantive, i.e. abilities, to the formal, i.e. titles, is an example of 
normative isomorphism.    
 
While the theory allows probabilistic predictions on the population level, institutional 
pressures are not assumed to lead deterministically to fully predictable responses on 
the level of the individual venture. ‘When organizations are not assumed to be 
invariably passive or active, conforming or resistant, then responses to the 
institutional environment become cast as behaviors to be predicted rather than 
theoretically predefined outcomes of institutional processes.’  (Oliver 1991, pg. 174) 
In other words the options available to organizations confronting institutional 
pressures include not only conformance and resistance, but also compromise, 
avoidance and manipulation (Oliver, 1991).   
 
IMPLICATIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES ON EMERGING OR NEW 
VENTURES 
 
Interestingly, institutional theorists have paid little attention to entrepreneurship and 
the creation of new ventures (Aldrich, 1999). While institutional theory thus is 
traditionally applied to existing organizations in older institutional fields, Aldrich and 
Fiol (1994) have argued that the same pressures apply to new organizations in new 
institutional fields. In fact, pressure to gain legitimacy, ambiguity/uncertainty, and 
political involvement may be greater for emerging organizations. It may also be 
argued that the increased political, media and academic interest in entrepreneurship 
(understood as new firm formation) has led towards considerable structuration 
tendencies. The growth of educational programs; a professionalized Venture Capital 
Industry; informal investor networks; business incubators that are connected via 
national and international networks; business plan competitions, and associations as 
well as media devoted specifically towards entrepreneurship issues suggest that the 
phenomenon of venture creation occurs under a much higher degree of structuration 
(according to DiMaggio & Powell’s four criteria above) today than, say, twenty years 
ago. This also indicates an increased relevance of applying an institutional perspective 
for understanding entrepreneurial phenomena.  
 
Some specific hypotheses derived from Institutional Theory are developed below. The 
hypotheses do not specify exactly what type of institutional influence is assumed to 
yield the expected effect. This is because—as observed by DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983)—these analytical categories are difficult to distinguish empirically. 
Consequently we lack direct and separate measurement of mimetic, normative and 
coercive pressures, respectively. However, in the discussion leading up to each 
hypothesis it is revealed what type of institutional pressures is assumed to underlie the 
expected effects.  
 
Pursuing and maintaining a steady flow of financing is crucial for the survivability of 
emerging organizations (Landström & Winborg, 1995). Acquiring the necessary funds 
to remain afloat is often tied to first establishing legitimacy. External investors, 
concerned for the well-being of their investment may exert pressure to force a change 
in the venture ideas their clients are pursuing. Such influence is likely to primarily 
coercive in nature. However, as banks, venture capital firms and other financial 
institutions are also ‘victims’ of the norms and role modeling of their own industry 
such coercion may have underlying elements of mimicking and norm compliance.   
 
Hypothesis 1a: The greater the dependence of a venture on external finance, 
the greater the degree of change in the venture idea. 
 
Business founders are often reluctant to grow their businesses (Wiklund, Davidsson & 
Delmar, 2003) and their initial aspirations are often relatively modest (Delmar & 
Davidsson, 1999). External investors looking to maximize their investment may see 
opportunities to expand the initial venture idea and attempt to coerce the venture into 
accepting these ideas. Interested in maintaining some level of control, the venture 
founders might try to compromise and include the suggestion without abandoning 
their initial idea.    
 
Hypothesis 1b: More external investors will cause the initial venture idea to 
broaden in scope. 
 
Ventures that rely on a dominant customer are often put in the precarious position of 
having to ‘jump through hoops’ to meet client demand. The legitimacy and ultimately 
survivability of the venture hinges upon keeping the end user placated. The dominant 
customer may choose to use this position of power to shape the idea of the company 
to better suit their needs. As a consequence the new or emerging venture may have to 
change aspects of their business models to conform to standards regarding delivery 
and payment terms, or through further fuelling normative pressures such as requiring 
a certain level of certification.  
 
Hypothesis 2a:  The greater the reliance on a dominant customer, the greater 
the degree of change in the initial venture idea.  
 
It may be in the best interest of dominant customers to keep their supplier in a 
position of subordination. Directly in line with Institutional Theory this may take the 
form of forcing the venture to become more similar to its peers, and hence more 
exchangeable. Alternatively, by guarding their leverage over the venture, the 
dominant customer may tacitly force the venture to fine tune its idea to better suit its 
specific needs, thus giving it less negotiating power due to its increased dependence.  
 
Hypothesis 2b: Reliance on a dominant customer will cause the initial venture 
idea to narrow in scope.  
 
Ventures located in incubators face normative, mimetic and to some extent also 
coercive pressures. For instance, both coercive and normative pressures occur in 
incubators regarding the writing of business plans (Karlsson, 2003). In addition, due 
to high external uncertainty the firms in the incubator likely have a tendency to mimic 
one another and hence incorporate elements of each other’s business ideas. It may 
also be suspected that normative pressures arise in incubators from received views 
that the market should be approached with a precisely defined business concept. 
Presumably, the ‘business plan rationality’ is at odds with fuzzy, broad or poorly 
articulated business ideas that cannot be convincingly communicated in concise 
writing.  
 
Hypothesis 3a: Ventures located in incubators will experience a higher degree 
of change in the venture idea than ventures not located in incubators. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Location in an incubator will cause the initial venture idea to 
narrow in scope.  
 
Ventures based on ideas that deviate too far from the norm face uncertainty and 
challenges to their legitimacy. Therefore, regardless of the specific source of the 
institutional pressure, institutional theory implies that more radical ideas are subject to 
stronger external pressure to conform. In such cases coercive and normative 
institutional pressures may be too great to ignore, causing a partial rethinking of the 
venture idea.   
 
Hypothesis 4: The more original a venture based idea, the greater the degree of 
change to the initial venture idea. 
 
Regarding originality Institutional Theory does not provide a basis for predicting the 
direction of change in terms of broadening or narrowing, which is why such an 
hypothesis is not specified here. 
 
METHOD 
Sample and procedure 
 
From a population of 321 young, knowledge-intensive firms that underwent a training 
program at Linköping University, telephone interview data were obtained from 167 
firms (52%) that were eligible (i.e., they could be identified), relevant (there was some 
kind of activity around the idea), and willing to cooperate. In order to facilitate the 
data collection the questionnaire and a cover letter were sent to respondents in 
advance so that they had access to it during the interview. Thanks to the respondents 
generally being highly qualified; the interactive phone interview mode, and examples 
illustrating complex concepts being given in the questionnaire, some seemingly 
complex questions (cf. below) could be posed without any apparent comprehension 
problems.  
 
As regards descriptive characteristics the following deserves mentioning: 
 
• the average firm age is 3.6 years 
• 70% employ less than 5 people and have a turnover less than 1.5 MSEK1 
• 40% want to expand 
• 60 % are started by teams 
• 61% are spin-off firms (32% come from the private sector) 
• three quarter (74%) are exclusively owned by the founder(s) 
• 60% are or have been located in a business incubator 
• 85% are offering a pure service concept or a combination of both products and 
services 
• 39% are selling services or products on the international market 
 
Variables 
 
Dependent variables. For hypotheses concerning Degree of change of the venture 
idea an index was constructed based on the questions ‘To what degree did the idea 
change?’ and ‘If it changed, to what degree was this due to external pressures?’ As the 
questions were repeated for the pre- and post start-up stages the total number of items 
is four, all or which were answered on five-point agree-disagree scales. This index has 
a range from 4 to 20; a mean of 10.03; std. dev. 3.99, and a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.77.  
For hypotheses concerning Direction of change of the venture idea were used various 
re-computed versions of the answers to the question ‘Please indicate the nature of the 
idea’s development over time,’ which originally had four response alternatives: a) the 
idea has undergone divergence (broadened); b) the idea has undergone convergence 
(focused); c) the idea remains unchanged and narrow, and d) the idea remains 
unchanged and broad. In the analysis is used a three-point version where the latter two 
categories have been combined to ‘no change’. The intended meaning of ‘divergence’ 
and convergence’ was further illustrated to the respondents by means of examples. 
 
Independent variables. The measure of External investors is the sum of external 
owner categories represented in the venture2. For ventures with no external owners 
this variable has the value zero. One is added for each type of external owner that the 
venture has. As many as 138 (83.1%) of the ventures have no external owners, and as 
a result this variable is highly skewed to the left, with a mean of 0.22 and std. dev 
0.58. For Dominant customer a computed dummy variable was used. Ventures whose 
most important customer accounts for 50 percent or more of sales get the value 1 on 
this variable. This characteristic is shared by 17.5 percent of the firms in the sample. 
The variable Incubator location is likewise a dummy variable with value 1 for 
ventures that either at the time of the interview or previously were located in an 
incubator, which goes for 42 percent of the sample. Originality is a computed index 
based on the questions ‘Please indicate the idea’s degree of research orientation’ and 
‘What degree of novelty did the idea have?’ Both of these questions were answered 
on five-point scales ranging from high to low. As the former question was re-stated 
for pre- and post start-up stages the resulting three-item index has a range from 3 to 
15; mean 8.03; std. dev. 3.65, and a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.81. It should be noted here 
that the Swedish original for ‘research’ has a more specific meaning than its English 
counterpart. It points clearly towards university research or systematic R&D and 
excludes, for example, ‘marketing research’ and the background ‘research’ conducted 
by journalists; phenomena for which other terms are used. The sophisticated 
respondents in this sample should have little difficulty interpreting its intended 
meaning. 
 
It should be noted that direct measures the quality of external pressures in terms of 
mimetic, coercive and normative are not included in this study. Hence we did not 
bring the hypotheses to this level of specificity, either. 
 
Control variables. A number of control variables are also included in the regressions. 
Apart from (log) Venture age all of these are dummy variables concerning the nature 
and origin of the venture or the venture idea: Team start-up, Spin-off; Product; 
Service; Internal, and Idea scope. The second to last variable distinguishes between 
ideas originating internally (1) vs. being adopted into the venture (0), while the last 
variable crudely characterizes the ideas as (initially) broad (1) or narrow (0) in scope.   
 
Analysis techniques 
 
For hypotheses regarding Degree of change OLS multiple regression analysis is 
applied. For the hypotheses regarding Direction of change bivariate as well as 
multinomial logistic regression has been tried. However, for reasons explained below 
the only displayed analysis is a cross-tabulation accompanied with the conventional 
Chi2 test.  
 
RESULTS 
 
Before turning to hypothesis testing let us first present some descriptive statistics to 
confirm that there is change in the venture ideas, and that the respondents agree that 
this is at least in part due to external pressures. Table 1 provides some information 
about this.  
 
TABLE 1 
Descriptive statistics on venture idea change and external pressure (n=166) 
 
Variable Mean Std. dev.
Degree to which the idea changed before start-up (1 low; 5 high) 2.30 1.78
Degree to which the idea changed after start-up (1 low; 5 high) 2.87 1.25
Change caused by external pressure, before start (1 low; 5 high) 2.09 1.30
Change caused by external pressure, after start (1 low; 5 high) 2.78 1.45
 
These data suggest that the original venture ideas undergo changes in a sufficient 
number of cases to make the below analyses meaningful. They also suggest that the 
respondents often perceive external pressures to be the source of such changes. 
Further, the data suggest that both the amount of change and external pressure are 
greater after start-up than in the formative stage that precedes it. Data not displayed in 
the table show that the respondents identify customers as the strongest source of 
external pressure, followed by ‘competition’, ‘investors’, ‘other’ and ‘suppliers’. 
Incubator influence was not separately asked for, so this should be included in the 
‘other’ category. There is perhaps reason to caution against social desirability or 
impression management tendencies here. Respondents may be more prone to agree to 
listening to the customers and to keeping up with the competition than to giving in to 
external stakeholder demands. However, overall the descriptive results suggest it is 
meaningful to further investigate the hypotheses derived from institutional theory on 
these data. 
 
Table 2 displays the regression analysis where the hypotheses regarding Degree of 
change are tested; i.e., hypotheses 1a, 2a, 3a and 4. In Model 1 the dependent variable 
is regressed on control variables only, in order not to over interpret explained variance 
that could be attributed either to the control variables or the theoretically derived 
explanatory variables. In Model 2 the explanatory variables are entered alongside the 
controls. 
 
TABLE 2 
Regression analysis with Degree of change as dependent variable (n=165) 
Note: Significance levels are single-tailed for explanatory variables and two-tailed for control 
variables.  ¤ = p<.10; * = p-.05; ** = p<.01; *** = p<.001. 
 
The results for Model 1 show that the control variables have very limited influence on 
degree of change of the venture idea. Ventures that are older and—in particular— 
those that are started as spin-offs report lower degree of change. The latter is possibly 
because such ideas are further developed before they are launched or even conceived 
of as distinct venture ideas, than are ideas leading to independent start-ups. The 
explanatory power of the model is miniscule, however. 
 
Also for Model 2 the explanatory power is modest. However, in a cross-sectional 
analysis with the type of measures used here (rating scales and dichotomous 
variables) one should not expect anything near full explanation even if all important 
variables are included (cf. Davidsson, 2004). Importantly, the analysis gives fairly 
clear support for hypotheses 1a, 2a, and 3a. Consistent with ideas derived from 
institutional theory, then, it is found that relatively more change of the venture idea is 
reported for ventures with more external investors. The same is true also for ventures 
with a dominant customer as well as those with an incubator location. The estimated 
effect is the strongest for the latter variable. The effect for originality is in line with 
hypothesis 4, but the effect is small and (therefore) not statistically significant. It thus 
cannot be ruled that original/novel/ radical venture ideas degree are neither more nor 
less subject to change in response to external pressures, than are more mundane 
venture ideas.  
 
Our hypotheses regarding Direction of change of the venture idea concern a variable 
that in the original is a four-category nominal variable. There are a number of 
multivariate approaches to analyzing the influence of a set of predictors on such a 
variable. Binomial and multinomial logistic regressions, using two- and three-
    Model 1 Model 2 
Explanatory variables   
External investors    .20** 
Dominant customer    .18** 
Incubator location     .27*** 
Originality  .09 n.s. 
Control variables   
Log. Venture age -.14¤   -.20* 
Team start-up (yes=1) .06 n.s.   -.02 n.s. 
Spin-off (yes=1) -.21*   -.24** 
Product focused venture (yes=1) -.01 n.s. .06 n.s. 
Service focused venture (yes=1) .10 n.s. .14 n.s. 
Internal idea (yes=1) .13 n.s. .11 n.s. 
Idea scope (broad=1) -.10 n.s. -.04 n.s. 
   
Adj. R2 .04  .16 
category versions of the dependent variable, were run for this analysis. Different cut-
offs have also been contrasted both including and excluding cases for which no 
change in either direction was reported. Generally speaking these models show very 
modest explanatory power and very weak relationships for control variables as well as 
theoretically derived explanatory variables. However, there was a somewhat 
consistent tendency for the variable Incubator location to appear with a significant 
effect across model specifications. Table 3 therefore displays the more easily 
interpreted bivariate result for this variable when it is cross-tabulated with Direction 
of change.  
 
TABLE 3 
Cross-tabulation of Incubator location with Direction of change (n=165) 
 
Incubator location 
 
0 
Never located in 
incubator 
1 
Now or previously 
located incubator Total 
1 Broadening 35 
(32.6) 
21 
(23.4) 56 
2 Focusing 16 
(25.0) 
27 
(18.0) 43 
Direction of 
change 
3 No change 45 
(38.4) 
21 
(27.6) 66 
Total 96 69 165 
Note: Chi2 = 10,92; d.f. =2; p=.004. Cell entries are observed frequencies and, within parenthesis, 
expected frequencies if there were no relationship between the two variables.    
 
As can be seen, the result is highly significant and in the expected direction. An 
inspection of the cells in the table reveals that the significant result appears because 
firms with an incubator location have a 50 percent higher than expected (27 vs. 18) 
probability of having made their venture idea more focused over time. Mirroring this, 
ventures that were never located in an incubator show change in this direction much 
less than expected (16 vs. 25). Thus, relatively clear support is found for hypothesis 
3b: location in an incubator will cause the initial venture idea to narrow in scope. This 
analysis also illustrates that what might appear as a weak and uncertain effect in a 
multivariate, variance-explaining model may in fact be a rather clear and strong 
effect, given the nature of the data and what strength of effect can reasonably be 
expected. 
 
While hypothesis 3b is supported the data give no support for hypotheses 1b or 2b, 
neither in multivariate analyses nor in bivariate cross-tabulations like that displayed in 
Table 3. We thus find no evidence that pressures from customers or investors lead to 
systematical change of venture ideas in a particular direction in terms of broadening 
or narrowing it.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Researchers increasingly view entrepreneurial discovery or opportunity recognition as 
a nonlinear process where the idea that becomes the foundation for a successful 
venture can be quite different from the idea the firm initiation was originally founded 
around (Klofsten, 2004). Previous literature that acknowledges both such a dynamic 
view and the idea that input from external parties is one reason for adaptations of the 
venture idea usually assumes that the adaptation makes the venture more viable, 
successful, or apt to achieve whatever underlying goals made the founders try to 
create it in the first place. This is similar to what DiMaggio and Powell (1983) call 
competitive isomorphism. The current study investigates the overlooked aspect that 
the development of venture ideas in many cases may be subject to a process of 
institutional isomorphism. The adaptations resulting from such a process may or may 
not be aligned with economic rationality or founders’ goal attainment. A certain 
degree of alignment would not be mere coincidence as compliance with at least some 
forms of institutional pressures should facilitate the attainment of legitimacy, which 
may be necessary for survival and success. There can be little doubt, however, that 
adherence to institutional forces will make emerging ventures less different from 
existing ventures and from their peers—that is, less innovative. In order to ensure not 
just marginal survival but to also retain some probability of above-average success, 
founders of new and emerging ventures may sometimes be better off resisting, 
compromising, avoiding or manipulating (Oliver, 1991) than eliciting the standard 
response of conforming to such pressures. 
 
Our empirical investigation and ensuing analysis confirmed several hypotheses that 
were derived from institutional theory. Hypothesis 1a: ‘The greater the dependence of 
a venture on external finance, the greater the degree of change in the venture idea’, 
was supported. The same goes for Hypotheses 2a: ‘The greater the reliance on a 
dominant customer, the greater the degree of change in the initial venture idea.’ The 
authors interpret these results as primarily the fruits of coercive institutional pressures, 
although elements of norm compliance and mimicking may in part underlie such 
coercion. Support was found also for 3a: ‘Ventures located in incubators will 
experience a higher degree of change in the venture idea than ventures not located in 
incubators, and 3b: ‘Location in an incubator will cause the initial venture idea to 
narrow in scope’. These effects of incubator location arguably have more to do with 
normative pressures (sometime enforced with an element of coercion) and tendencies 
for co-located firms to mimic elements of each other’s business models.       
 
While the results are largely in line with institutional theory, other theoretical 
perspectives make similar suggestions. For example, the issue dealt with in 
Hypothesis 2b about (over-)adapting to one strong customer might—had it been 
supported—be interpreted as having to do with asset specificity, which is a concept 
from Transaction Cost Economics (Williamson, 1975)3. It can further be argued that 
hypotheses generated concerning dependence on stakeholders would have been better 
grounded in resource dependence theory (Oliver, 1991). Admittedly, when the 
coercion leads to adaptation to the needs of, e.g., a particular customer without at the 
same time making the venture more similar to a population of other ventures the 
process at work is not strictly one of isomorphism. However, whether emerging 
organizations are seen as resource dependent or as entities that respond to institutional 
pressure the coercive forces and effects should arguably remain the same.  
 
To the extent this study’s results reflect tendencies towards isomorphism it has not 
been directly assessed empirically whether the firms in the sample have, for 
institutional reasons, changed their ideas more or differently in ways that are best for 
them. This means that some results may reflect competitive rather than institutional 
isomorphism, or institutional pressures whose results coincide with competitive 
isomorphism. Importantly, however, the authors would argue that the presented 
theorizing and results is reason to be alerted to the fact that institutional isomorphism 
that lead to suboptimal adaptations may be at work. In particular, the question whether 
incubator pressure to narrow down the idea is productive or not deserves further 
scrutiny.  
 
Of course, this study is not devoid of technical shortcomings. The sample is non-
random; however it is relatively homogeneous and, arguably, theoretically relevant. 
Single respondent measures were taken. In the case of large organizations this may 
pose a significant drawback, but given the small size of ventures studied, this should 
only be minor issue. Ad hoc and sometimes single item or dichotomous measures 
were taken. The typical effect of this, however, is to deflate rather than exaggerate 
results. It is actually encouraging that the theoretically derived hypotheses held up 
despite the relative crudeness of some measures and other limitations of the data. In 
spite of these limitations, the authors would argue that answers to interesting and 
relevant questions were uncovered. 
 
Future research should do a better job at measuring institutional pressure. For 
example, researchers should try to develop multi-item batteries to separately measure 
mimetic; coercive and normative pressures, respectively. The outcomes of adhering to 
institutional pressures relative to not doing so should also be assessed, to the extent 
possible. Moreover—which we think would be a contribution to the heart of 
institutional research itself—it would be of great interest to see studies that 
investigated both parties involved in the process. As this would allow for assessment 
both of the intent and the effect of the pressure quite interesting possibilities, all of 
which have not been much highlighted in the institutional literature, can be 
investigated. For example, there may be at least four types of intent behind the 
pressure: a) a selfish intent without regard for the eventual fate of the new venture; b) 
an intent to further the interest of both parties; c) an ‘altruistic’ intent to help the new 
venture without considering the consequences for ones own organization (presumably 
possible for incubators and some business angels), and c) unintentionally exercising 
pressures that nonetheless has effects. As regards effects there are also at least four 
possibilities: i) better for the organization exercising the pressure; ii) better for the 
new venture; iii) better for both, and iv) better for neither. This makes for 16 
combinations, which appears to include possibilities usually not discussed in accounts 
of institutional theory.   
 
Despite its tentative nature, this study has provided input for viewing change in the 
discovery (or ‘opportunity recognition’) process as not solely internally driven or 
reflecting only such adaptations that facilitate survival and success. Institutional 
pressures in general, and dominant customers, external investors and incubator 
experience in particular, are factors that help explain change in evolving venture 
ideas. It would serve entrepreneurship theory and practice well to learn more about 
the precise nature of such change.   
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